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In response to the Russian Federation’s purported ‘annexation’ of Crimea and the conflict 
between separatists in the Donbass region and the central government of Ukraine, the 
United States, the European Union, Japan, and Australia, the principal countries, have 
imposed economic sanctions upon Russian officials, firms, and private individuals. The 
economic sanctions imposed upon the Russian Federation violate public international 
law on three grounds: 1) lack of authorisation under the United Nations Charter; 
2) inapplicability of Art. XXI GATT (‘Security Exceptions’); and 3) lack of legal authority 
based on the International Law Commission’s Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for 
Internationally Wrongful Acts. Fidelity to the ‘rule of law’ requires an immediate withdrawal 
of all economic sanctions. By contrast, the international community ‘ought to’ condemn 
Ukraine’s indiscriminate killing of innocent citizens living in the Donbass region and support 
the efforts of the Russian Federation to provide humanitarian aid to the region.
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1. Introduction1
the argument that sanctions and restrictions imposed against russian officials, 
firms, and agencies do not constitute economic sanctions against the russian 
1  this article does not support the characterization of the integration of Crimea into the russian Federation 
as an ‘annexation,’ but as an event of ‘democratic secession.’ See steven wheatley, Modelling Democratic 
Secession in International Law, in Nationalism and globalisation: New settings, New Challenges (stephen 
tierney, ed.) (hart Pub. forthcoming), available at <http://ssrn.com:abstract=2511216> (accessed Jul. 28, 
2015). other countries participating in economic sanctions against the russian Federation are: Canada, 
greenland, Iceland, Norway, French guiana, and several Caribbean islands.
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Federation as a sovereign state is disingenuous. A sovereign state, meeting the 
criteria of the Montevideo Convention on the rights and duties of states,2 is a juridical 
entity incapable per se of taking action without representatives or agents of the 
state. the multiple rounds of ever expanding sanctions against russian officials, 
firms, and private individuals effectively constitute sanctions against the russian 
Federation for two reasons. First, public officials, firms, and private individuals 
are the instrumentalities through which a sovereign state exercises its right as 
a juridical entity and takes action. second, the economic sanctions are intended to 
cause a change in the foreign policy of the russian Federation. Further support for 
this conclusion derives from the nature of the sanctions. the economic sanctions 
threaten russian national security interests by targeting the russian Federation’s 
military industry, and oil and gas sector, and assets held abroad. travel restrictions are 
imposed upon private individuals deemed to have acted for the russian Federation 
in the ‘ukraine’ affair. the failure of France to deliver two Mistral-class warships to 
the russian Federation, based on a contract between the two sovereign states, 
demonstrates that the ‘russian Federation’ is the objective target of the economic 
sanctions and restrictions. Carefully worded declarations fail to provide an exemption 
from the mandate of international law.
the united Nations is the singular institution, emerging from the close of 
the world war II, established to maintain international peace and security and 
to avoid the perils of another war.3 It is the exclusive forum for states to resolve 
differences peacefully and is the world’s sole authority to set rules governing 
the use of military and non-military force by Member states for actions deemed 
to threaten international peace and security, the predominant objective of the 
uN Charter.4 Member states cannot exercise force outside the ambit of the uN 
Charter or determine, individually or severally, whether an action taken by a state 
constitutes a threat to international peace and security. the security Council is 
vested with the exclusive authority to sanction the use of force against belligerent 
states deemed to have violated a mandatory international norm.5 without security 
Council authorization, Member states forfeit an attribute of sovereignty and are 
prohibited from deploying force against another sovereign state. the uN general 
Assembly’s adoption of five resolutions, starting with the declaration on the 
Inadmissibility of Intervention in the domestic Affairs of states and Protection 
of their Independence and sovereignty (1965), clarify that a ‘state may no 
longer claim a general legal right to impose economic sanctions against other 
2  Convention on rights and duties of states, december 26, 1933, 49 stat. 3097 [hereinafter Montevideo 
Convention].
3  u.N. Charter Art. 1, para. 1.
4  Id. Preamble, para. 1.
5  Id. Art. 2, para. 4.
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states.’6 the economic sanctions imposed against the russian Federation run afoul 
of this fundamental axiom of the uN Charter to prohibit rogue action by individual 
Member states pursuing their economic, military, and political agenda outside the 
parameters of the uN Charter.
Equally devoid of authority for justifying unilateral imposition of economic 
sanctions against the russian Federation is reliance upon Art. XXI of the general 
Agreement on tariffs and trade.7 Article XXI states that the gAtt will not prevent 
a wto member ‘from taking any action which it considers necessary for the 
protection of its essential security interests . . . taken in time of war or other 
emergency in international relations . . .’ since the gAtt does not define critical 
terms, such as ‘considers necessary,’ ‘essential security interests,’ ‘time of war,’ and 
‘emergency in international relations,’ it arguably allows a state to determine 
subjectively whether there is a war or ‘other emergency in international relations.’ 
however, this reading is predicated upon false assumptions. ‘war’ is a term of art 
in public international law and does not countenance subjective determination; 
although the phrase ‘other emergency in international relations’ is not a term of 
art, it does not follow that states may self-judge its meaning, because the gAtt 
rules are not designed to be self-judging.8 In any event, Art. XXI gAtt, a provision 
6  Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion against Developing Countries: Report 
of the Secretary-General, u.N. doc. A/52/459 (1997). See: Declaration on the Inadmissibility of Intervention 
in Domestic Affairs of States and the Protection of Their Independence and Sovereignty, g.A. res. 2131, 
u.N. gAor, 20th sess., supp. No. 14, ¶ 2, u.N. doc. A/6014 (1965), at <http://www.un-documents.net/
a20r2131.htm> (accessed Jul. 28, 2015); Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning 
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in Accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, 
g.A. res. 2625, u.N. gAor, 25th sess., supp. No. 28, Annex, u.N. doc. A/5217 (1970), at <http://www.
un-documents.net/a25r2625.htm> (accessed Mar. 7, 2015); Declaration on the Inadmissibility of 
Intervention and Interference in the Internal Affairs of States, g.A. res. 36/103, u.N. gAor, 36th sess., 
supp. No. 51, u.N. doc. A/36/51 (1982), at <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/36/a36r103.htm> 
(accessed Jul. 29, 2015); Elimination of Coercive Economic Measures as a Means of Political and Economic 
Compulsion, g.A. res. 51/22, u.N. gAor, 51st sess., supp. No. 49 I, u.N. doc. A/51/49 (1996), at <http://
www.un.org/documents/ga/res/51/ares51-22.htm> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015); and Unilateral Economic 
Measures as a Means of Political and Economic Coercion against Developing Countries, g.A. res. 52/181, 
u.N. gAor, 52nd sess., supp. No. 49 I, u.N. doc. A/52/49 (1997), at <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/
view_doc.asp?symbol=A/rEs/52/181> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
7  general Agreement on tariffs and trade, oct. 30, 1947, Art. XXI, 61 stat. A-11, 55 u.N.t.s. 194, at <https://
www.wto.org/english/docs_e/legal_e/gatt47_e.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015) [hereinafter gAtt].
8  Mitsuo Matsushita et al., the world trade organization: Law, Practice, and Policy 597 (2nd ed., oxford 
university Press 2006); see also Law of Armed Conflict deskbook (2012), at <http://www.loc.gov/rr/
frd/Military_Law/pdf/LoAC-deskbook-2012.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015) that defines the term ‘war’ as 
comprising four elements: ‘(a) a contention; (b) between at least two nation-states; (c) wherein armed 
force is employed; (d) with an intent to overwhelm’ (id. at 7). By contrast, the term ‘armed conflict’ 
comprises ‘[a]ny difference arising between two states and leading to the intervention of armed forces’ 
(id. (quoting Convention (I) for the Amelioration of the Condition of the wounded and sick in Armed 
Forces in the Field: Commentary 32 (Jean s. Pictet, ed.) (International Committee of the red Cross 1952), 
available at <http://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/gC_1949-I.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015))). 
ukraine, never mind the rest of the world, would be hard pressed to meet either definition.
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within a multi-lateral trade agreement, cannot be invoked to undermine the 
foundations and design of the uN Charter.9 In addition, except for ukraine, Art. XXI 
is not germane for countries participating in the economic sanctions against the 
russian Federation, since national security interests are not open-ended, unless they 
are taken to a point of absurdity, an interpretation not countenanced by principles 
of legal interpretation.10
Further unavailing is recourse to the International Law Commission’s draft Articles 
on responsibility of states for Internationally wrongful Acts.11 First, the draft Articles 
are not primary law, as adopted only by the International Law Commission. second, 
the draft Articles are subordinate to the uN Charter thereby bringing the matter back 
full circle to the sole institution charged with regulating breaches of international 
peace and security.12 third, the draft Articles require objective proof of a predicate 
act: the target state has breached an international obligation under international 
law.13 omission of proof of the predicate act cuts off all countermeasures ostensibly 
authorized by the draft Articles.
Consequently, countries imposing economic sanctions against the russian 
Federation violate public international law principles to achieve a common 
political agenda: contain the renaissance of the russian Federation, eviscerate its 
political influence, and protect the hegemony of the united states and European 
union. Moreover, the conduct of the Eu and ukraine, as it ‘shells’ its citizens into 
submission in defiance of their rights, conflicts with their obligations under the 
9  See Mosunova, infra n. 35.
10  the united states department of defense maintains that us national security rests upon three 
pillars:
‘Protect the homeland, to deter and defeat attacks on the united states and to support civil authorities 
in mitigating the effects of potential attacks and natural disasters.
Build security globally, in order to preserve regional stability, deter adversaries, support allies and 
partners, and cooperate with others to address common security challenges.
Project power and win decisively, to defeat aggression, disrupt and destroy terrorist networks, and 
provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief’ (Quadrennial defense review 2014, at v, at 
<http://www.defense.gov/pubs/2014_Quadrennial_defense_review.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015)). 
the egomaniacal character of this position is self-evident. the troubling expansion of us notions of 
its security interests are well-noted in Laura k. donahue, The Limits of National Security, 48 Am. Crim. 
L. rev. 1573 (2011), available at <http://scholarship.law.georgetown.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?articl
e=2027&context=facpub> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
11  Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, in report of the International 
Law Commission, u.N. gAor, 53rd sess., supp. No. 10, u.N. doc. A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in 2 y.B. Int’l L. 
Comm’n 20 (2001), u.N. doc. A/CN.4/sEr.A/2001/Add.1, at <http://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/
english/commentaries/9_6_2001.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015) [hereinafter draft Articles].
12  Id. Art. 59, at 143.
13  Article 3 of the draft Articles provides: ‘the characterization of an act of a state as internationally 
wrongful is governed by international law. such characterization is not affected by the characterization 
of the same act as lawful by internal law’ (id. at 36).
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European Convention on human rights [hereinafter EChr] and the International 
Covenant on Political and Civil rights.14
2. The United Nations Charter
Member states of the united Nations do not have a right to impose economic 
sanctions upon another Member states or any sovereign state. Article 2(4) of the uN 
Charter ‘prohibits all uN members from resorting to the threat or use of force against 
the territorial integrity or political independence of any state.’15 while the word ‘force’ 
initially was generally understood to refer to military force, various resolutions adopted 
by the general Assembly and culminating in the 1997 uN secretariat’s convening of 
an ad hoc group on the use of economic sanctions dispelled any doubt that basic 
principles of international law limited the meaning of the word ‘force’ to military 
action.16 the ad hoc group concluded that ‘basic legal norms’ proscribe ‘the imposition 
of coercive economic measures as instruments of intervention in matters that are 
essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state.’ dr. szasz states: ‘[A]s the 
twentieth century reaches its close, at least de lege ferenda no state may any longer 
claim a general legal right to impose economic sanctions against other states . . .’17
therefore, the question of authorizing the imposition of economic sanctions 
upon states falls squarely within the authority of the security Council under Ch. V of 
the uN Charter. Article 24(1) clarifies this mandatory obligation: ‘Members confer 
on the security Council primary responsibility for the maintenance of international 
peace and security, and agree that in carrying out its duties under this responsibility 
the security Council acts on their behalf.’18 the process leading to a security Council 
decision to impose sanctions follows a multi-step procedure comprising formal 
requirements. the first step is a determination by the security Council under Art. 39 of 
14  See, e.g., Ushakov and Ushakova v. Ukraine, no. 10705/12 (Eur. Ct. h.r., Jun. 18, 2015) (ukraine was found 
to have violated Art. 3 of the European Convention on human rights ); see also Report: War Crimes of 
the Armed Forces and Security Forces of Ukraine: Torture of the Donbass Region Residents (English), Free 
ukraine Now (Mar. 13, 2015), <http://freeukrainenow.org/2015/03/13/report-war-crimes-of-the-armed-
forces-and-security-forces-of-ukraine-torture-of-the-donbass-region-residents-english-pdf/> (accessed 
Jul. 29, 2015) (among other things, Liliya rodionova, deputy head of the Committee for refugees and 
Prisoners of war (donetsk), remarks in part: ‘some were thrown into a pit with dead bodies, crushed 
with a shovel bucket, had a smoldering iron stuck in their mouth. People were kept in iron containers 
with no source of oxygen. the torture techniques are sophisticated and brutal, they leave the victims 
maimed. those in need of medical treatment, even with diabetes, receive no medical assistance’).
15  Paul szasz, Chapter XVII. The Law of Economic Sanctions, in the Law of Armed Conflict: Into the Next 
Millenium (= 71 International Law studies) 455, 456 (Michael N. schmitt & Leslie C. green, eds.) (Naval 
war College 1998), available at <https://archive.org/details/lawofarmedconfli71schm> (accessed 
Jul. 29, 2015).
16  Id. at 456–58
17  Id. at 458.
18  u.N. Charter Art. 24, para. 1.
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‘the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression.’19 
this first step requires the security Council to investigate a purported dispute under 
Art. 34 ‘to determine whether the continuance of the dispute or situation is likely 
to endanger the maintenance of international peace or security.’20 having made an 
investigation under Art. 34, and having made a determination under Art. 39, the 
Council may, pursuant to Art. 40, ‘call upon the parties concerned to comply with such 
provision measures as it deems necessary or desirable.’21 Article 41 gives the security 
Council exclusive authority to decide which measures, short of military force, are 
to be employed to effectuate its decisions:22 ‘these may include complete or partial 
interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, air, postal, telegraphic, radio, 
and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations.’23 
Article 51, the only exception to this procedure, articulated as the inherent ‘right 
of self-defense’ is inapplicable regarding the economic sanctions imposed against 
the russian Federation.
the security Council has not found that the russian Federation has committed 
an act of aggression, likely to endanger international peace and security, or an act 
to destabilize the peace or stability of ukraine.24 despite the spate of scholarship 
critical of the annexation of Crimea by the russian Federation, these articles are 
not dispositive of the question, since it is the security Council, not the collective 
thoughts of scholars ensconced in the citadels of academia, that determine whether 
the annexation of Crimea constituted an act likely to endanger international peace 
and security. In addition, the scholarship, marginalizes the 97% approval rating 
under the referendum (dismissing the results out of hand by unproven allegations 
of voting irregularities), and focuses primarily upon the alleged use of force to annex 
Crimea, historically part of russia, and an autonomous region under ukraine. the 
annexation raises political, as much as legal questions and, under the post-world 
war II structure to resolve international disputes, is exclusively a matter for security 
Council review and determination.
Equally ambiguous as to transgressions committed by the russian Federation are 
references to the destabilization of the donbass region in Eastern ukraine. Advocates 
of human rights such as Barack obama, Angela Merkel, and david Cameron blithely 
observe the central government in kiev maim and kill children in the donbass, 
destroy schools, hospitals, living quarters, and essential infrastructure, apparently 
19  u.N. Charter Art. 39.
20  Id. Art. 34.
21  Id. Art. 40.
22  Id.
23  Id. Art. 41.
24  See infra n. 42 (referring not to a security Council resolution, but a general Assembly resolution 
68/262 adopted March 27, 2014).
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justifying these actions upon scant, and debatable evidence of russian Federation 
interference.25 the international media has demonstrated its impotence to conduct 
a non-biased inquiry into events in the donbass. satellite images taken by NAto are 
too imperceptible to establish the use of russian military force in the donbass, and 
the source of the images is non-neutral: NAto.26 the accusations made against the 
russian Federation may be deemed reckless, provocative, and contrary to principles 
underlying the international order implemented by Bretton woods.
Consequently, the following conclusions ineluctably follow the analysis of the uN 
Charter: 1) absent security Council authorization, no state may impose economic 
sanctions against the russian Federation; 2) the economic sanctions are intended 
to violate the principle of equality embodied in the uN Charter, by aiming to secure 
an internal change in the foreign policy of the russian Federation. Although the 
countries participating in the economic sanctions are countries with substantial 
gdP, and high rates of per capita income, the uN Charter does not allocate influence 
by economic development and wealth. the large majority of member countries of 
the uN do not participate in the us / Eu led use of economic sanctions against the 
russian Federation.
the security Council has not found that the russian Federation has threatened 
the peace or stability of ukraine, or has committed an act of aggression. Ample 
opportunity exists to confirm the presence of russian military in ukraine through 
the open skies treaty and the deployment of other surveillance technology available 
to the us and its allies. No data supports the allegations of President obama, his 
representatives, and counterparts in the Eu, Japan, and Australia, that the russian 
Federation has mobilized troops and artillery in ukraine to support insurgents in 
the donbass. the accusations may be deemed reckless, provocative, and contrary to 
principles underlying the international order to resolve disputes short of ‘force.’
3. Article XXI ‘Security Exceptions’ GATT
Advocates justifying economic sanctions against the russian Federation by 
invoking Art. XXI gAtt exemplify acts both desperate and cunning. the acknowledged 
ambiguity of Art. XXI has the potential to bury the ‘security exception’ in a bottomless 
quagmire and to generate a debate obfuscating rather than illuminating the 
25  See, e.g., Ukrainian Army Shells Donetsk Monastery, PrAVMIr.CoM (sep. 19, 2014), <http://www.pravmir.
com/ukrainian-army-shells-donetsk-monastery/> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
26  See More Evidence of Russian Invasion: NATO Satellite Imagery Shows Russian Artillery in Ukraine, youtube 
(Aug. 29, 2014), <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=h8VcXdzBsEs> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015). only 
an expert in reading satellite photography could make sense of these images? Importantly, in 2015, 
a NAto Commander admitted lying about the russian invasion of ukraine. See stephen Lendman, 
NATO Commander Lied Claiming ‘Russian Invasion of Ukraine,’ global research (Jan. 23, 2015), <http://
www.globalresearch.ca/nato-commander-lied-claiming-possible-russian-invasion-of-ukraine-
coming/5426437> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
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exception.27 It is time to confine the scope of this pernicious provision of the gAtt, 
and recognize the ‘exception’ for what it is: a vestigial remnant of a right lost through 
development of modern legal rules. First, the uN Charter takes precedence over 
the wto to settle threats to international peace and security, since the wto is 
a multilateral trade agreement with objectives distinguishable from preservation 
of international peace and security. second, the series of uN general Assembly 
resolutions reinforcing the concept that the imposition of economic measures is 
within the exclusive competence of the security Council, have amended effectively 
Art. XXI under the legal principle of lex specialis derogat lex generalis as the general 
Assembly resolutions follow in time the adoption of Art. XXI, and the overriding 
obligation to read law as comprising a matrix of harmonized rules discredits 
flamboyant efforts to resuscitate this dead norm. third, Matsushita, schoenbaum 
and Mavroidis clarify that no individual country may self-judge a state of ‘war’ and the 
term ‘emergency’ must be confined to serious matters determined by wto dispute 
settlement panels.28 No panel decision dealing with Art. XXI has ever been adopted 
principally for procedural rules: lack of wto jurisdiction.
Article XXI provides:
Nothing in this Agreement shall be construed
(a) to require any contracting party to furnish any information the 
disclosure of which it considers contrary to its essential security interests; 
[not applicable] or
(b) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action which it 
considers necessary for the protection of its essential security interests,
(i) relating to fissionable materials or the materials from which they are 
derived [not applicable];
(ii) relating to the traffic in arms, ammunition and implements of war and 
to such traffic in other goods and materials as is carried on directly or indirectly 
for the purpose of supplying a military establishment [not applicable];
(iii) taken in time of war or other emergency in international relations; or
(c) to prevent any contracting party from taking any action in pursuance 
of its obligations under the united Nations Charter for the maintenance of 
international peace and security.
A concrete case demonstrates the absurd consequences of Art. XXI(b)(iii) when 
its terms are construed literally, that is, to allow a nation to self-judge the phrase 
‘emergency in international relations.’ In 1985, the united states justified, on the basis 
27  See, e.g., Peter Lindsay, Note. The Ambiguity of GATT Article XXI: Subtle Success or Rampant Failure?, 
52 duke L.J. 1277 (2003), available at <http://scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.
cgi?article=1192&context=dlj> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
28  Matsushita et al., supra n. 7, at 597.
RUSSIAN LAW JOURNAL    Volume III (2015) Issue 3 134
of Art. XXI, measures prohibiting all imports of goods and services of Nicaraguan 
origin as well as all us exports to Nicaragua, stating that the exception left it to each 
contracting party to judge what action it considered necessary for the protection 
of its own essential security interests.29 At the insistence of the united states, the 
terms of reference of the gAtt Panel that considered the matter, precluded the Panel 
from examining the validity of the us invocation of Art. XXI. while the gAtt Panel’s 
final report was not adopted, it did state that a nation relying on the exception 
must balance its need to do so against the more fundamental need for stable trade 
regulation, not to mention, in the view of this author, world peace. In 1986, the 
International Court of Justice found the us imposed Nicaraguan embargo to be in 
violation of international law. Laying mines in the waters of Nicaragua to enforce the 
embargo constituted an additional violation of customary international law.30 typical 
of the united states, the pre-eminent forerunner in violations of international law, 
President reagan ignored the orders of the ICJ.
According to Ms. desierto, Professor of Law at the university of hawaii, ‘[t]he 
escalating trade wars between the us and Eu against russia bring to the forefront 
interrelated questions on the nature of self-judged security exceptions under 
international trade law, and the largely unsettled state of international, law on unilateral 
economic sanctions.’31 she states: ‘[t]heir international legality depends on their scope, 
the modalities of their implementation, and territorial (or extraterritorial) effects on 
the targeted state’32 (unhelpful legal jargon). Eventually, Ms. desierto notes, rightly, 
that unilateral imposition of economic sanctions had the capacity to undermine uN 
Charter obligations.33 however, she fudges her position by providing that the key to the 
legality of the unilateral economic sanctions is to be found in a non-law instrument: 
the draft Articles, a mistake that if repeated enough may raise this reference to the 
International Law Commission [hereinafter ILM] to the level of doctrine.34
taken to its logical conclusion, a liberal reading of the Art. XXI ‘security Exceptions’ 
would destabilize the foundations of the uN Charter, unwind 60 years of developing 
29  gAtt Council, Minutes of Meeting. Held in the Centre William Rappard on 29 May 1985, C/M/188, at 2–16 
(Jun. 28, 1985), at <https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/suLPdF/91150029.pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 
2015); gAtt Council, Minutes of Meeting. Held in the Centre William Rappard on 17–19 July 1985, 
C/M/191, at 41–46 (sep. 11, 1985), at <https://www.wto.org/gatt_docs/English/suLPdF/91160043.
pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
30  Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶ 190 (June 27).
31  diane A. desierto, The EU/US v. Russia Trade Wars: Revisiting GATT Article XXI and the International 
Law on Unilateral Economic Sanctions, EJIL: Talk! (sep. 22, 2014), <http://www.ejiltalk.org/the-euus-
v-russia-trade-wars-revisiting-gatt-article-xxi-and-the-international-law-on-unilateral-economic-
sanctions-2/> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
32  Id.
33  Id.
34  Id.
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a system of international law to resolve disputes by peaceful negotiations, and 
promote the fragmentation of national states by allowing any state, in its self-interest, 
to disturb both free trade and the coordinated use of sanctions under the rubric of 
the uN Charter. therefore, any interpretation of Art. XXI capable of destroying the 
entire dispute system of international peace and security must be rejected.
By analogy, this conclusion is supported by the jurisprudence of the wto on Art. XX 
ostensibly designed to protect non-trade values. these non-trade values encompass 
a spectrum of values, including public morals, human, animal or plant life, the products 
of prison labour, and exhaustible natural resources. only one case of twenty attempts 
has been successful in justifying gAtt-inconsistent measures.35 Ms. Mosunova argues 
persuasively, that a predicate of invoking Art. XX is that its application should not 
undermine the wto multilateral trading system.36 Further, the author states: ‘[t]he 
purpose of the wto’s establishment was not promotion of human rights but “peaceful 
and predictable interstate economic relations free of political maneuvering”.’37
Likewise, the wto dispute settlement system ought to constrain the application 
of Art. XXI even further. the wto is not a forum to settle political disputes about 
threats to national security, and an expansive reading of this exception would 
undermine the entire wto multilateral trading system and the uN Charter. the 
united states, European union, Japan, and Australia lack essential security interests 
in a civil war in ukraine, unless the concept of ‘essential security interest’ is stretched 
to an absurdity, as it was under the Clinton Administration when the Caspian sea was 
deemed a matter of national security interest.38 the russian Federation has not taken 
any action against the united states or its allies. Indeed, the russian Federation has 
taken the opposite tack, providing information within its possession and offering to 
broker a settlement. ukraine arguably is the only state that could rely upon Art. XXI, 
but ukraine has not invoked this provision of the gAtt.
however, the us, Eu, Japan, Australia and other countries that have imposed 
economic sanctions against the russian Federation may have violated peremptory 
norms of international law by intervening in the internal affairs of the russian 
Federation to cause a modification of its foreign policy, and may have violated 
peremptory norms of internal law by providing military assistance to ukraine in its 
effort to defeat by lethal means its internal conflict in the donbass region. ukraine 
is indiscriminately killing its citizens, and committing appalling atrocities in Eastern 
35  Natalya Mosunova, Are Non-Trade Values Adequately Protected under GATT Art. XX?, 2(2) russian 
Law Journal 102 (2014), available at <http://www.russianlawjournal.org/index.php/jour/article/
download/34/30> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015). doi:10.17589/2309-8678-2014-2-2-101-113
36  Id. at 105.
37  Id. at 111.
38  steve Levin, the oil and the glory: the Pursuit of Empire and Fortune on the Caspian sea (random 
house 2007).
RUSSIAN LAW JOURNAL    Volume III (2015) Issue 3 136
ukraine, who are exercising rights of self-determination under treaties signed by 
ukraine, us, Eu, and Australia.39
while public international law is razor thin on what actions a sovereign may take 
to quell an internal conflict, killing its citizens, including civilians, children, the sick 
and elderly, does not accord with the moral principles espoused publicly by the us / 
Eu axis. In addition, the us / Eu support of the kiev regime has enabled ukraine to 
destroy schools, hospitals, residences, and transport infrastructure in the donbass. 
the international community of states must question, if not condemn, the aggression 
of the us / Eu, and any other countries involved in imposing punitive measures 
against the russian Federation in the absence of independent corroboration and 
a security Council determination.
4. International Law Commission Draft Articles  
on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts
the ILM does not have the authority to implement binding legal instruments, 
though its draft legislation often serves as the basis of international norms adopted 
by uN authorities. Nevertheless, the draft Articles are not law and are the product of 
the ILC, a commission that drafts model legislation.40 with the single exception that the 
draft Articles partially embody customary law of state responsibility, the draft Articles 
may be used as guidelines, but nothing more. Article 2 defines ‘an internationally 
wrongful act of a state’ as: ‘there is an internationally wrongful act of a state when 
conduct consisting of an action or omission: (a) is attributable to the state under 
international law, and (b) constitutes a breach of an international obligation of a state.’ 
the predicate act requires a determination by the security Council.41
the only objective evidence offered by the uN related to any wrongful act of the 
russian Federation is contained in the resolution 68/262 adopted by the general 
Assembly on March 27, 2014, and entitled ‘territorial Integrity of ukraine’42 (resolution 
68/262 never adopted by the security Council). this two-page resolution consists of 
conclusory statements and notes only as a basis for violation of ukraine territorial 
39  Amnesty International reports torturing and killing of prisoners of war from the donbass. See Донецкий 
иеромонах рассказал, как его пытали украинские силовики [Donetskii ieromonakh rasskazal, kak 
ego pytali ukrainskie siloviki [Donetsk Hieromonch Told How He Was Tortured by the Ukrainian Security 
Officers]], PrAVMIr.ru (Apr. 11, 2015), <http://www.pravmir.ru/donetskiy-ieromonah-rasskazal-kak-
ego-pyitali-ukrainskie-siloviki-video/> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
40  the fact that general Assembly resolution 56/83 of december 12, 2001, ‘annexed the text of the 
articles and commended them to governments’ gives them weight, it fails to elevate their status to 
law. See Malcolm N. shaw, International Law 568 (7th ed., Cambridge university Press 2014).
41  this conclusion follows from the fact that ‘it is international law that determines what constitutes an 
internationally unlawful act, irrespective of any provisions of municipal law’ (id. at 569).
42  territorial Integrity of ukraine, g.A. res. 68/262, u.N. gAor, 68th sess., u.N. doc. A/rEs/68/262 (2014), at 
<http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/rEs/68/262> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
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sovereignty that ‘the referendum held in the Autonomous republic of Crimea and the 
city of sevastopol on 16 March 2014 was not authorized by ukraine.’  the resolution 
did not find that the russian Federation committed an internationally unlawful act 
against ukraine, which forms the basis of state responsibility and provides remedies 
for breach of that fundamental principle of international law. rather, the resolution 
identified a municipal law violation. Further, the resolution called upon ‘all states . . . 
not to recognize any alteration of the status of the Autonomous republic of Crimea 
or of the city of sevastopol.’  the language is precatory and not expressed in terms 
of mandatory obligations of states. hence, if despite the ‘call,’ the russian Federation 
does not heed it, it does not follow that the russian Federation has breached an 
international norm of state responsibility thereby rendering inapposite recourse 
to reprisals or countermeasures articulated by the ILC.
Compelling is the absence of any language in the resolution authorizing 
‘all states’ to impose economic sanctions upon the russian Federation. the only 
reference to the ‘russian Federation’ in the resolution is contained in a paragraph 
in the Preamble referencing the treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Partnership 
between ukraine and the russian Federation of May 31, 1997. the resolution was 
approved by 100 states, with 11 states voting for rejection, 58 states abstaining 
from the vote, and 24 states absent from the voting, hardly constituting worldwide 
unequivocal support of the contents of the resolution.
Further, while due respect must be accorded to the resolution, the language 
is strikingly conclusory in character. Although this article is not the venue to 
deconstruct the reasoning of the resolution, the resolution fails to consider the right 
of self-determination of the voting population of Crimea that cannot be dismissed 
outright because the domestic constitution of ukraine did not provide for such 
procedure, since that logic would preclude the exercise of self-determination, since 
populations wanting to exercise that right would be required to receive the blessing 
the of the very state it seeks to leave. Public international law cannot countenance 
such an absurd result. the resolution also ignores the distinct history of the russian 
Federation and the disintegration of the soviet union, which left russians in many 
former republics of the ussr.43
subsequent to the disintegration of the ussr, Crimea was an autonomous 
republic within ukraine. Crimea had its own legislature and capitol, simferopol, 
and a city, sevastopol, granted special state significance within ukraine, since the 
russian Federation maintained its Black sea Fleet in sevastopol. In 1991, the people 
of Crimea participated in several referendums. one referendum proclaimed the 
43  hugo Flavier, Russia’s Normative Influence over Post-Soviet States: The Examples of Belarus and Ukraine, 
3(1) russian Law Journal (2015), available at <http://www.russianlawjournal.org/index.php/jour/
article/download/67/73> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015) doi:10.17589/2309-8678-2015-3-1-6-32. Following 
the logic of the united states, that the entire world is its province of national security, the russian 
Federation is entitled to regain its standing as a great state. Id. at 8.
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region an Autonomous republic within the soviet union, with 93.26% of the voters 
supporting the measure. As events quickly unfolded, another referendum asked if 
the electorate of Crimea supported the independence of ukraine from the soviet 
union – a question gathering 54% of the vote. however, a referendum on Crimea’s 
independence from ukraine was indefinitely banned from being held, leading 
critics to assert that their lawful rights were oppressed by kiev authorities. the 2014 
referendum followed the installation of an illegal central government in kiev and 
a law banning the use of russian language. the 2014 referendum is reminiscent of 
the suppressed 1991 referendum providing for Crimea to leave ukraine.44
Even if the integration of Crimea into the russian Federation is characterized as 
an annexation, and presumed to violate the customary law of state responsibility, it 
does not follow that the russian Federation must ‘return’ Crimea to ukraine. without 
reviewing in-depth defenses available to the russian Federation, it is useful to look 
at the legal consequences of an internationally wrongful act (Art. 28 of the draft 
Articles). Article 30 is inapposite as the annexation will never be unwound.45 Article 31 
speaks of reparation. But what reparation is due to ukraine for the annexation of 
a territory consistently ignored by ukraine since its independence, in terms of financial 
contribution to infrastructure improvement over a period of 20 years, not to mention the 
investment in Crimea made by the ussr prior to its disintegration. the burden of proof 
rests upon ukraine to open its national accounting records to determine the amount 
of investment in Crimea since ukraine’s independence. the russian Federation has 
assumed a multi-billion euro liability, since the central government in kiev has evinced 
its interest principally in gold-paving the capitol of kiev, particularly the khreshchatyk, 
and in siphoning off funds raised both locally and internationally to enrich corrupt 
public officials.46 the integration of Crimea into the russian Federation, including 
the assumption of pension, medical service debt, and the cost of modernizing the 
infrastructure of Crimea, particularly its educational, manufacturing and shipbuilding 
industries, involves two states: ukraine and the russian Federation. how the interests 
of the united states, Eu, Japan, and Australia, to mention only the principal actors, 
are implicated must await comprehensive reports by each state. simply put, without 
security Council determination, these countries lack any basis to interfere with the 
internal affairs of the russian Federation. the us / Eu axis cannot usurp control of the 
united Nations to advance their foreign affairs agenda.
44  The Crimean Referendums of 1991 and 1994, <http://culturedarm.com/2014/03/19/the-crimean-
referendums-of-1991-and-1994/> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
45  Following that rationale, the united states that illegally annexed hawaii in the 19th century would 
be under an international and moral imperative to return the islands to the indigenous population 
of hawaii.
46  oliver Bullough, Welcome to Ukraine, the Most Corrupt Nation in Europe, the guardian (Feb. 6, 2015), 
<http://www.theguardian.com/news/2015/feb/04/welcome-to-the-most-corrupt-nation-in-europe-
ukraine> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
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5. The Regional Protection of Human Rights
ukraine is a member of the EChr.47 ‘unlike international treaties of the classic 
kind, the Convention comprises more than reciprocal engagements between 
contracting states. It creates, over and above a network of mutual and bilateral 
undertakings, objective obligations, which in the words of the preamble, benefit 
from a collective enforcement.’48 Assume, for purposes of argument, that ukraine is 
undertaking a systematic killing of citizens in the donbass, the question that arises 
is: what are the consequences under the EChr? the answer is clear: ukraine is in 
violation of Art. 1 entitled ‘obligation to respect human rights,’ that states: ‘the high 
Contracting Parties shall secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and 
freedoms defined in section I of this Convention.’ section I protects ‘the rights of 
beneficiaries under the EChr’ providing for a right to life, prohibition against torture, 
right of freedom of expression, right to a fair trial, and no punishment without law. 
Article 15 is of dubious merit, since there is no ‘war’ and, if there is an ‘emergency’ 
within the meaning of Art. 15, it was created by the kiev central government. the Eu 
has a moral obligation to make certain that a state within its ‘neighborhood’ fulfills 
its obligations under the EChr.
6. Conclusion
First and foremost, any dispute regarding recent developments in Crimea involve 
only two states: ukraine and the russian Federation. Economic sanctions imposed 
against the russian Federation by third party states violate the uN Charter, since 
they lack security Council sanction and, contrary to the principle of equality of states 
embodied in the uN Charter, amount to impertinent interference in the internal 
affairs of the russian Federation.
second, Art. XXI gAtt, if applicable at all, is applicable to ukraine only, and not 
the meddling third party states.49 In addition, Art. XXI cannot be read to undo the 
comprehensive system for resolving international disputes set forth in the uN Charter, 
as clarified by numerous general Assembly resolutions. third, characterizing Crimea’s 
integration within the territory of the russian Federation as an illegal annexation 
is a premature rush to judgment that disregards complex facts of Crimean history 
and diminishes the illegal regime change in kiev.
47  European Convention on human rights (as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14, supplemented 
by Protocols Nos. 1, 4, 6, 7, 12 and 13), at <http://www.echr.coe.int/documents/Convention_ENg.
pdf> (accessed Jul. 29, 2015).
48  shaw, supra n. 40, at 251.
49  In particular, the denunciation of the russian Federation by the us, a country based upon theft (land 
and property), ethnic cleansing, unchecked military aggression, illegal annexations, and dubious 
moral imperatives to expand its powers is a caricature of hypocrisy. Equally unavailable to the Eu is 
the doctrine of ‘clean hands.’
RUSSIAN LAW JOURNAL    Volume III (2015) Issue 3 140
Practically speaking, the russian Federation has legal options to right the series 
of wrongs. First, the russian Federation has standing to bring suit against third party 
countries before the International Court of Justice on the ground of the illegality of 
the sanctions. the respondents should be unable to raise the question of the status 
of Crimea as a defense, since the latter question is irrelevant to the main claim of the 
russian Federation. second, the russian Federation may file a claim with the wto for 
violation of the principles of non-discrimination. while that tactic would inevitably 
involve a defense under Art. XXI, it is difficult to imagine how remote third party 
states have standing to argue ‘harm.’ third, the russian Federation may offer free 
legal assistance to people and legal entities in the donbass harmed by the military 
action undertaken by kiev to file claims against ukraine with the European Court 
of human rights. Fourth, the russian Federation has the option of doing nothing. 
the strategy of ‘doing nothing’ is very powerful.50
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